I apply the notion of a self-con…rming equilibrium (SCE) to study how information feedback in …rst price auctions (e.g. whether all bids or only the winning bid are revealed at the end of each auction) in ‡uences bidders' perceptions about their strategic environment, and consequently their bidding behavior. In a private values setting, revealing the two highest bids is su¢ cient for bidders to have correct beliefs (which justi…es the standard assumption of Nash equilibrium). In contrast, in every symmetric SCE of a symmetric, a¢ liated, private values model, bidding strategies and revenue are (weakly) higher when only the highest bid is revealed compared to the case where at least the two highest bids are revealed. I also obtain results when valuations are interdependent and discuss the implications for the empirical auction literature.
Introduction
In practice, the information that bidders receive about auction outcomes is often a design choice of the auctioneer. In the private sector, it is common for the auctioneer to reveal only the winning bid (and many times not even this) at the end of each auction. 1 In contrast, in the public sector the law usually mandates all bids to be revealed. In both cases, it may be of interest to know whether a di¤erent information policy would result in di¤erent outcomes.
I study how di¤erent information feedback policies a¤ect competitive bidding in …rst price auctions. In particular, I focus on a speci…c role of feedback: the amount of information regarding outcomes of past, similar auctions may presumably a¤ect bidders'beliefs about their strategic environment, including their beliefs about how competitors are bidding in these auctions as well as beliefs about their own valuation of the object or procurement cost (in a common value setting). This role of feedback is ignored in the literature when attention is restricted to the (Bayesian) Nash equilibrium of the …rst price auction, which requires bidders to have correct beliefs about the equilibrium strategies of other players and about the distribution of valuations, so that, e.g., bidders correctly anticipate their probability of winning with any possible bid. In contrast, in this paper players'beliefs about their probability of winning the auction are in ‡uenced by the amount of information that they observe from previous auctions.
The proposed setup is inspired by the empirical literature on auctions, where the stage game is a standard, single-object, …rst price sealed-bid auction and data are observed from play of several identical and independent auctions. 2 In this context, the empirical literature asks whether the primitives of the stage game (such as the distribution of valuations) can be identi…ed from the data available to the researcher under the assumption that bidders play a Nash equilibrium, and then proceeds to estimate the model (see Athey and Haile (2006, forthcoming) for a review of this literature). But just as identi…cation depends on the data observed by a researcher, whatever players can learn about their strategic environment is also likely to depend on the data that are available to them. As suggested by the quote at the beginning of the paper, bidders do seem to behave as empirical researchers and use information about past bids to learn about their strategic environment. 3 I model the e¤ect of di¤erent feedback policies on bidders' beliefs about opponents' strategies and the primitives of the economy by assuming that bidders play a self-con…rming equilibrium (SCE) (Battigalli (1987) , Fudenberg and Levine (1993a) , Dekel, Fudenberg, and Levine (2004) ). A SCE is often interpreted as the outcome of a learning process, in which players revise their beliefs using observations of previous play. 4 A SCE is similar to a NE in that it is a steady state solution concept applied to a well-de…ned stage game where players choose strategies that are optimal given their beliefs about the consequences of choosing any feasible strategy. In particular, repeated game considerations (e.g. how feedback a¤ects collusion) are ignored in this paper. 5 The di¤erence between a NE and a SCE is that in a SCE beliefs are not required to be correct, but instead restricted to be "consistent" with feedback that players obtain about equilibrium outcomes. To illustrate the meaning of "consistent", suppose that a bidder always observes the winning bid in the context of playing a series of identical …rst price auctions. The de…nition of SCE then requires her to have correct beliefs about the equilibrium distribution of the winning bid but not necessarily correct beliefs about the equilibrium distribution, say, of the second highest bid. By allowing for incorrect beliefs, the set of SCE contains the set of NE and coincides with it only when players have correct beliefs in every SCE.
The main objective is to answer two related questions. First, how much information about opponents'bids needs to be revealed so that bidders have correct beliefs in a SCE (therefore implying that each SCE is also a NE)? This question is important to the extent that several theoretical and empirical results in the literature are obtained under the assumption that bidders play a NE. Second, what is the e¤ect of di¤erent information policies on (self-con…rming) equilibrium bidding, with a particular emphasis on the revenue-maximizing information policy? The answers to these questions depend on whether types are independent or correlated (a¢ liated), valuations are private or interdependent, and bidders are symmetric or asymmetric. 6 In the private values model, beliefs are always correct in a SCE when the auctioneer reveals at least the two highest bids (implying that the sets of SCE and NE coincide in this case). The reason is that the only uncertainty relevant to bidders concerns their probability of winning as a function of their o¤ers. This probability is determined by the distribution of the maximum of opponents' bids, an statistic that is always observed when the highest two bids are revealed.
In contrast, when only the winning bid is revealed a bidder will not observe the maximum of opponents' bids when she wins the auction. Hence, in equilibrium she is only required to have correct beliefs about the probability of winning with o¤ers higher than her equilibrium bid (since she observes the maximum of opponents'bids only in that range of bids). As a result, in a SCE view bidders as learning from past data, but I also follow the equilibrium implications of everyone behaving in such a manner. 4 Explicit learning-theoretic foundations have been provided by Fudenberg and Levine (1993b) . 5 The e¤ect of feedback on collusion has been emphasized at least since Stigler (1964) . For recent studies of this complementary role of feedback see Athey and Bagwell (2001) , Athey, Bagwell, and Sanchirico (2004) , and Skrzypacz and Hopenhayn (2004) . 6 Valuations are private when they do not depend on opponents' private signals. Otherwise, they are said to be interdependent. These signals can be either independent or a¢ liated (a strong form of positive correlation). Symmetry refers both to the valuations and to the underlying distribution of signals.
a bidder may overbid relative to the best response of a bidder who has correct beliefs about the probability of winning for each possible bid. 7 The previous overbidding result establishes a testable relationship between the (perceived) best response of a player in a SCE and the best response of a player who has correct beliefs, as in a NE. However, it does not necessarily follow that self-con…rming equilibrium bidding is more aggressive. The reason is that it is not true, in general, that our previous comparison of best responses su¢ ces to obtain an unambiguous comparison of the set of equilibria. I do show, however, that in the symmetric a¢ liated private values model of Milgrom and Weber (1982) any symmetric SCE is (weakly) more aggressive than the unique NE when only the winning bid is revealed. Furthermore, I establish existence of non-Nash SCE's that are strictly more aggressive and provide strictly higher revenue than the unique NE.
To focus on the new issues that arise when valuations are interdependent, consider the case where the auctioneer reveals at least the two highest bids. In this case bidders may only have incorrect beliefs about the expected surplus from winning the object. Under the often realistic assumption that bidders only receive feedback about the value of the object when they win it, bidders learn about the times they were too optimistic about value, but need not learn they are sometimes too pessimistic. Using a line of reasoning analogous to the one applied for the private values case, it follows that a bidder may now underbid in a SCE relative to the optimal strategy of a bidder with correct beliefs. I then apply the …ndings on comparative statics in symmetric …rst price auctions to conclude that when at least the two highest bids are revealed in a symmetric, a¢ liated model with interdependent valuations, revenues are lower in a symmetric SCE as compared to a NE. When the two highest bids are not revealed, the e¤ect identi…ed in the case of private values a¤ects outcomes in the opposite direction, and equilibria ranking is ambiguous even in a symmetric model.
The results for the symmetric model suggest that in a private value setting an auctioneer might want to limit the amount of information revealed about submitted bids to either increase revenues or lower procurement costs. 8 When valuations are interdependent, an auctioneer might bene…t from providing information about the ex post value of an object. The reason is that when bidders observe the realized value of the object (irrespective of whether they win or lose), in a SCE they must have correct beliefs about the expected value of the object. Thus, the sets of SCE and NE coincide (assuming at least the two highest bids are revealed, as explained above), and there is consequently no underbidding in equilibrium. This information policy could be implemented by requiring the winner to provide information about the revenue obtained from the use of the object. For example, in US o¤shore oil and gas lease sales the federal government publishes monthly data on the production of oil and gas (Porter, 1995) .
Another implication of assuming that bidders play a SCE is that the Dutch (i.e. descending) and …rst price auctions are not equivalent, unless only the highest bid is revealed in the latter. Hence, information feedback constitutes an alternative, non-psychological explanation to the nonequivalence of the Dutch and …rst price auctions. 9 Several papers in the experimental literature emphasize that behavior depends on the amount of feedback that players receive as they learn to play the game. 10 In the context of …rst price auctions, Isaac and Walter (1985) , Neugebauer and Selten (2006) , and Ockenfels and Selten (2006) show that in experimental settings with independent private values overbidding occurs when subjects only receive feedback about the winning bid, compared to the case where they receive more feedback about their opponents'bids. The results in this paper shed light not only on the forces that may be behind their …ndings but also suggest new directions for further experimental work. 11 In a recent paper, Jehiel (2007) also looks at feedback in auctions as a design issue. In contrast, he allows for more general auction formats and focuses on a di¤erent kind of feedback. In his framework, bidders obtain coarse feedback about past bids, so that, for example, only the aggregate distribution of bids across the various auction formats that the auctioneer has implemented in the past are revealed. 12 In Section 2, I describe the model and de…ne both NE and SCE. I then present conditions for beliefs to be correct in a SCE in Section 3, and characterize non-Nash SCE behavior in Section 4. In Section 5, I discuss implications for the empirical auction literature and show that SCE behavior imposes testable restrictions on observed bids. I brie ‡y conclude in Section 6, and relegate all proofs to the Appendix.
Setup and de…nition of equilibrium
Consider the following stage game, which describes a standard …rst price auction. There are N risk-neutral bidders who simultaneously submit bids for a single object. 13 The bidder who submits the highest bid gets the object and pays her bid; more generally, the winner is chosen randomly from the set of bidders who submit the highest bid. Before submitting their bid, each bidder i receives a signal or type s i 2 [s i ; s i ] R + . Player i's utility from winning the object is v i b i , 9 A few experimental papers have shown that the winning bid tends to be higher in IPV …rst price auctions compared to Dutch auctions (e.g., Cox, Robertson, and Smith 1982). However, these experiments report only the winning bid in …rst price auctions, so that the observed di¤erence must be attributed to reasons other than information feedback. It would be interesting to see whether this result would be reversed when more information is revealed in …rst price auctions, as predicted by the analysis in this paper. Cox et al. 1982 ), a non-equilibrium model of level-k thinking (Crawford and Iriberri, 2007) , and a model where bidders feel regret depending on the feedback they receive about others'bids (Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Katok (2007) and Filiz and Ozbay (2007) ). 1 2 He also considers cases where a bidder only gets feedback about the aggregate distribution of bids that were submitted in other, similar auctions where, in contrast to this paper, the bidder has not participated. 1 3 The results can be easily adapted to the case where an object is being procured rather than sold.
where v i 2 R + is her …nite valuation and b i 2 R + is her o¤er. Losing bidders pay nothing, and their utility is normalized to zero. Signals and valuations are drawn according to a joint probability distribution F S;V over the random variables S = (S 1 ; :::; S N ) and V = (V 1 ; :::; V N ): Additional regularity assumptions will be made on F S;V , but only in the context of the symmetric model in Section 4. A (pure) strategy i is a function mapping types to bids, and a pro…le of strategies is denoted by = ( 1 ; :::; N ): Player i's bid under strategy i is a random variable B i = i (S i ), and B 1 and B 2 are the highest and second highest bids among B 1 ; :::; B N .
Beliefs. Let G i denote the set of all joint distributions over (B i ; V i ). Each player i of type s i has a belief G s i 2 G i over the bids of other players and her own valuation of the object. The expected pro…t from choosing bid b i that is perceived by player i of type s i who has belief G s i is
where the expectation is taken according to the distribution G s i . Let G 0 
, where the probability is taken using the marginal distribution over B i implied by G s i .
In the more general case where the private values assumption does not hold, valuations are said to be interdependent.
Consistency of beliefs.
In a SCE, beliefs are required to be consistent with the information feedback that players would obtain from repeatedly playing their equilibrium strategies in a sequence of independent auctions. Let I i denote the set of all functions of the random variables (B 1 ; :::B N ; V i ), and let I i I i denote the feedback observed by bidder i. For example, I i = fB i ; B 1 ; V i g implies that bidder i observes her own bid, the highest of all bids, and her own valuation at the end of each auction. 15 Throughout, I make the natural assumption that B i 2 I i , so that players always observe their own bids. 1 4 The standard private values assumption requires that Vi j si D = Vi j si; s i. Here I also make explicit that players know how their signals map into their expected valuations, so that requiring si = E(Vi j si) is just a normalization. From the point of view of type s i , the distribution of observable outcomes depends not only on her own type s i and on others' strategies (which determine the joint distribution over (B i ; V i )), but also on the bid b i (which determines B i = b i ) that is chosen in equilibrium by type s i . The distribution over (B 1 ; :::; B N ; V i ) then determines the joint distribution over the set of observable random variables in I i . Consistency requires a player to have correct beliefs about this distribution of observable outcomes.
if the joint distribution of the random variables in I i , conditional on B i = b i , is the same whether the joint distribution over (B i ; V i ) is given by G s i or by the correct distribution G 0
De…nition of Equilibrium. In a SCE, players choose strategies that are optimal given their beliefs, and these beliefs are required to be consistent with observables obtained through feedback. 16 De…nition 3 (self-con…rming equilibrium) The strategy pro…le is a self-con…rming equilibrium (SCE) with information feedback fI i g i2N if for every player i and for almost every type s i there exists a belief G s i such that:
When beliefs are correct, the de…nition of a SCE coincides with the de…nition of a Bayesian Nash equilibrium (NE). Let SCE and N E denote the set of self-con…rming and Nash equilibria, respectively. It follows from the de…nition that N E SCE, since consistency does not rule out the case where players may somehow have correct beliefs. The objective of this paper is to further characterize and compare these equilibrium sets for di¤erent information policies that may naturally arise in …rst price auctions.
In applications, it may also be desirable to place additional restrictions on beliefs. One example is the private values restriction de…ned above. Other examples will be considered in the paper.
Interpretation. The idea underlying the concept of SCE is that the stage game is being repeatedly played and that players use the information revealed after each stage game to update their beliefs. This interpretation is analogous to thinking of bidders as econometricians in a context that is standard in the empirical auction literature. Here, bidders participate in several identical but independent auctions, where for each auction bidders draw a di¤erent type and valuation from the primitive F S;V , and draws are independent across auctions. Bidders then use observable outcomes from previous auctions to form beliefs about their strategic environment. A SCE simply captures the steady state of such a dynamic process, but the dynamic process itself is left unspeci…ed (see Fudenberg and Levine (1993a) and Dekel, Fudenberg, and Levine (2004) for more on the interpretation of SCE).
Conditions for correct beliefs in a SCE
In this section I study conditions on the feedback policy under which beliefs are correct in a SCE, and therefore the set of SCE coincides with the set of NE. This question is related to the literature on identi…cation in auctions (Guerre, Perrigne and Vuong (2000), Athey and Haile (2002) ). While that literature studies the observables that are needed for an econometrician to identify the primitives of an auction model, this section is concerned with the observables that are needed for a bidder to have correct beliefs in equilibrium and consequently justify the Nash equilibrium assumption. These questions are related because in order for an econometrician to identify the primitives of the model, he must …rst identify the strategic environment (e.g. probability of winning) being faced by each bidder. This relation explains the close parallels between the bidder identi…cation results in this section and the econometrician identi…cation results in the literature. The proofs of these results di¤er slightly to the extent that the bidders are part of the game (therefore observing their own types and bids, and determining endogenously through their actions what they are going to observe in equilibrium).
Private values model. In the private values model, observing at least the two highest bids results in correct beliefs in a SCE. The reason is that by observing the two highest bids, a bidder always observes the maximum of opponents'bids, and therefore (by the consistency requirement) must have correct beliefs about the distribution of the maximum of opponents'bids. Such distribution determines the probability of winning for every possible bid, which is the only source of uncertainty in the private values model. 17 Proposition 1 SCE = N E in the private values …rst price auction where the two highest bids are observed.
In contrast, when only the winning bid is observed, a bidder no longer observes the maximum of opponents'bids when she is the winner of the auction. Section 4 shows that non-Nash SCE exist in this case, so that the corresponding bidders' SCE strategies are sustained by incorrect beliefs. However, by making the additional restriction that valuations are independently distributed and that bidders are aware of this fact (which must be assumed, since it does not follow from consistency of beliefs), we recover the result that beliefs are correct in a SCE even if only the winning bid is observed. 18 De…nition 4 (independent valuations) The independent private values model is a private values model where in addition (i) S 1 ; :::; S N are mutually independent and (ii) for each player i: for every s i ; s 0 i , G s i and G s 0 i both imply the same distribution over B i .
Proposition 2 SCE = N E (restricted to the set of bids that win with strictly positive probability 19 ) in the independent private values …rst price auction where only the winning bid is observed.
The proof relies on two arguments. First, since the winning bid is observed, a bidder of a particular type observes the maximum of the opponents' bids whenever she loses the auction. Consistency then requires her to have correct beliefs about the distribution of the maximum of opponents'bids in the range of bids that are higher than the equilibrium bid for her particular type. Second, under the independence assumption a bidder knows that the distribution of other bidders'bids is independent of her own type. Hence, she can use what she knows about other players'bids when she is of a type that chooses low bids, since this information continues to be valid when she is of a type that chooses higher bids. 20 Interdependent values model. Without the private values assumption, equilibrium outcomes depend not only on beliefs about the probability of winning but also on beliefs about the expected surplus from winning the object with a certain bid. Beliefs are correct in a SCE when the two highest bids are observed and, in addition, players observe the realization of their own valuations after each auction. Essentially, observing one's own valuation is equivalent to having correct beliefs about one's own valuation, as in the private values model. 21 Proposition 3 SCE = N E in a …rst price auction where players observe the two highest bids and their own valuations.
In many situations, it may be more reasonable to assume that players observe the realization of their own valuation when they win the object, but not otherwise. In this case, non-Nash SCE exist and are characterized in the next section. 1 8 The restriction that players must know that signals are independent and take this knowledge into account when learning about their opponents' bids might explain why in the private-value experimental settings of Isaac and Walter (1985) and Neugebauer and Selten (2006) described in the introduction bidders do not actually play a Nash equilibrium, but rather behave in a manner consistent with our results for a non-independent setting. 1 9 This weaker condition is su¢ cient for it to be valid to focus on Nash equilibrium. The reason is that bids that win with probability zero are arbitrary to the extent that they can be replaced with bids that also win with probability zero without a¤ecting neither the utility of the agents nor the revenue of the auctioneer.
2 0 The idea in the second argument appears in Example 1 of Dekel, Fudenberg and Levine (2004) . The parallel result in the identi…cation literature is given by Athey and Haile (2002, Theorem 6(i)). The di¤erence is that in Proposition 2, bidders'identities need not be observed and bids need not have a common support. 2 1 Relatedly, in the pure common value model, Hendricks, Pinkse, and Porter (2003) obtain identi…cation when the econometrician observes ex-post the common value of the object. The setting in Proposition 3 is more general but also requires each bidder to observe ex-post the value of her own valuation.
Characterization of non-Nash SCE behavior
In this section I characterize SCE in those cases where players need not have correct beliefs in equilibrium. From Section 3, these are the cases where only the winning bid is observed (in the private values model), or where the two highest bids are observed but bidders only observe their own valuation in the auctions that they win (in the interdependent values model). While a useful characterization of SCE can be obtained without making further assumptions, an unambiguous comparison of equilibria (and therefore a comparison of di¤erent feedback policies) requires that we specialize the setting to the symmetric model of Milgrom and Weber (1982) .
and de…ne L i ( i ) in exactly the same way except that the maximization problem takes places with respect to Consider Lemma 4 for the private values model. The only if part con…rms the intuition that there is in some sense overbidding when only the winning bid is revealed. It says that if is a SCE then, for every bidder i and for every type s i , it would actually be optimal to bid i (s i ) if restricted to choose some bid that is higher than i (s i ). In addition, bidding i (s i ) must provide at least expected utility of zero, since that is the utility that bidders know that they can at least obtain by bidding zero. Hence, either i (s i ) is a best response to other bidders'strategies or it involves overbidding relative to (any) best response. Intuitively, overbidding is possible since a winning bidder does not get feedback about how much money was left on the table (i.e. the di¤erence between her bid and the second highest bid).
On the other hand, part (ii) suggests that there is in some sense underbidding in the interdependent values model: either i (s i ) is a best response to other bidders' strategies or it involves underbidding relative to (any) best response. To see this, note that, as previously determined, observing the two highest bids implies that in equilibrium bidders have correct beliefs about their probability of winning. Furthermore, since a bidder of a particular type observes both her own valuation and the maximum of the opponents'bids (which is below her equilibrium bid) when she wins, by consistency she must have correct beliefs about her expected valuation had she chosen any bid below her equilibrium bid. Hence, in equilibrium bidders have correct beliefs about their expected pro…ts from choosing bids below their equilibrium bids.
However, Lemma 4 only states that over/underbidding may occur with respect to the best response to others'strategies, but this result does not imply that in (a self-con…rming) equilibrium bidders will overbid relative to Nash equilibrium behavior. An important lesson from the modern comparative statics literature (e.g. Milgrom and Roberts, 1994 ) is that obtaining a monotone ordering of best responses is in general not su¢ cient for equilibria to be compared. When only the winning bid is revealed, it is indeed possible to construct examples with both (self-con…rming) equilibrium underbidding and overbidding relative to Nash equilibrium. 22 An interesting question is whether it is possible to obtain sharp predictions about the e¤ect of di¤erent information policies in those particular auction settings where auction theory also obtains unambiguous comparative statics results. 23 I use Lemma 4 together with a property of symmetric, a¢ liated …rst price auctions (see below) to show that the previous statements regarding over/underbidding also hold in equilibrium.
In addition, Lemma 4 implies that in a setting where only the winning bid is revealed a SCE can still be characterized as a …xed point of a (generalized) "best response" correspondence. This characterization can be useful for …nding a SCE (e.g. by numerical computation in a discrete bid setting), for testing whether bidders play a SCE in the data and for estimating the primitives of a structural model under the assumption that bidders play a SCE (see Section 5), and for showing that a candidate pro…le constitutes a SCE, as illustrated below. A multiplicity of beliefs can sustain the previous SCE. For example, G s can be such that type s believes her probability of winning with a bid b is given by
The monotone-symmetric model. Now I restrict attention to the symmetric setup of Milgrom and Weber (1982) , where the following assumptions are added to the setup in Section 2: (i) V i = u i (S 1 ; :::; S N ), where u i (s) = u(s i ; fs i g) and u is nonnegative, twice continuously di¤eren-tiable, nondecreasing in s i and increasing in s i ; (ii) S 1 ; :::; S N are a¢ liated random variables with joint density f that is symmetric, continuously di¤erentiable on its support [s; s] N , and bounded away from zero and in…nity; and (iii) bidders are restricted to play nondecreasing strategies. I will refer to this setting as the monotone-symmetric model. Assumptions (i) and (ii) imply that bidders are symmetric in terms of their signals and valuations, so that I drop the i subscript for this symmetric model, and now represents a strategy rather than a strategy pro…le. Assumptions (ii) and (iii) imply a monotone ordering of expected valuations in terms of the o¤ered bid.
In the monotone-symmetric model there exists a unique Nash equilibrium and it is in symmetric, continuous, increasing, and di¤erentiable strategies (Milgrom and Weber (1982) , McAdams (2007) ). Similar results hold for the set of SCE under a natural restriction on beliefs.
In addition, I make the following restriction on beliefs, which is immediately satis…ed in the private values model. 24 De…nition 5 (monotone beliefs) Beliefs are monotone if for every player i and type s i , the belief 
Lemma 6 Let
N E be the (symmetric) Nash equilibrium of the monotone-symmetric …rst price auction. Suppose opponents play a symmetric pro…le such that is increasing and lim s!s (s) = N E (s):
In words, part (a) roughly says that for a strategy pro…le that is (i) a potential SCE, and (ii) not higher than the Nash equilibrium strategy, there is a positive measure of types s that, facing , would obtain higher utility by choosing some bid that is higher than (s) rather than by choosing (s): To gain some intuition for this result, let N E be the NE and consider a strategy that is lower than N E and a particular type s at which the slope of is ‡atter than the slope of N E . By de…nition of Nash equilibrium, N E (s) is optimal for type s given that others play N E , so that at N E (s) the marginal payo¤ change from increasing the bid is zero. Consider the same type s but now suppose others play . Suppose type s were to bid (s). Then both the probability of winning and the expected valuation of the object would be the same as when opponents were playing N E and she was best responding with N E (s). The di¤erence is that now the marginal payo¤ change from increasing her bid is positive since: (i) (s) < N E (s) implies surplus is higher, (ii) the slope of is ‡atter than the slope of N E at s, and therefore she would now outbid more types by slightly increasing her bid, and (iii) the expected value of the objects she wins does not decrease when she increases her bid. Hence, type s would obtain higher utility by choosing some bid larger than (s) than by choosing (s).
Comparing feedback policies in the monotone-symmetric model. In the monotonesymmetric model with private values, the policy of revealing only the winning bid can be unambiguously compared to the policy of revealing at least the two highest bids.
Proposition 7
Consider the monotone-symmetric …rst price auction with private values where the winning bid is observed. Let N E be the unique (symmetric) Nash equilibrium and suppose that SCE is a symmetric SCE. Then SCE N E .
Essentially, starting from a symmetric strategy pro…le that is below the symmetric Nash equilibrium strategy, Lemma 6(i) implies that a positive measure of types would gain by increasing their bid. However, as Lemma 4(i) indicates, in a SCE bidders cannot gain by increasing their bid. On the other hand, a strategy below the NE is not necessarily ruled out as a SCE since, while Lemma 6(ii) implies that a positive measure of types would gain by decreasing their bid, in a SCE bidders need not have correct beliefs about what would happen in equilibrium if they lower their bid.
Proposition 7 immediately implies the following result. 25 Corollary 8 In the monotone-symmetric …rst price auction with private values, the policy of revealing only the winning bid results in weakly higher revenues than the policy of revealing at least the two highest bids when bidders play a symmetric (self-con…rming) equilibrium.
The next result establishes the existence of non-Nash SCE, so that from the previous result bidding is strictly more aggressive for such SCE compared to the NE. 26 Proposition 9 Consider the monotone-symmetric …rst price auction with private values where the winning bid is observed. Let N E be the unique (symmetric) Nash equilibrium and let the function : [s; s] ! R + be di¤ erentiable, nondecreasing, and satisfy (s) = 0 and (s) < s N E (s) for all
The idea of the proof proceeds in two steps: …rst, look for a strategy such that its best response is lower than itself and such that expected utility is nonnegative for every type; and second, check that for every s, (b j G 0 s; ) is quasiconcave in b, so that for every s, (s) is a better response to than any bid higher than (s).
Analogous arguments can be made for the interdependent values model. The next result is a direct consequence of Lemmas 4(ii) and 6(ii). 27 Proposition 10 Consider the monotone-symmetric …rst price auction where beliefs are monotone and where only the two highest bids and winners' own valuations are observed. Let N E be the unique (symmetric) Nash equilibrium, and suppose that SCE is a symmetric SCE. Then
Proposition 10 implies that, when bidders observe the two highest bids and observe their own valuation only when they win, symmetric equilibrium bidding is less aggressive relative to NE (or to the case where bidders also observe their realized valuations in auctions where they lose). An implication is that an auctioneer might increase revenues by providing information about the ex post value of the object. For example, if the object is exploited to obtain future revenues, the auctioneer might want to require the bidder to report her revenues. This is actually the case in US o¤shore oil and gas lease sales, where the federal government publishes monthly production of oil and gas.
Finally, consider the case where only the winning bid is observed, rather than the two highest bids. Regarding beliefs about valuations, since now only the winning bid is revealed, a bidder may be uncertain about the expected value of the object were she to win with either a higher or a lower bid. Regarding beliefs about strategies, a bidder may be uncertain about her probability of winning with a lower bid. Although the second e¤ect takes a speci…c direction, the …rst e¤ect can take any direction, leading to no unambiguous ranking of best responses and, consequently, of equilibria. Therefore, it is not necessarily true that revealing only the winning bid yields more revenue when valuations are interdependent. 28 Equilibrium re…nements. Since the concept of SCE often leads to a multiplicity of equilibrium outcomes, in the future it may be worth exploring several re…nements. One possibility is that players decide to experiment in such a way that they end up with correct beliefs, as in a Nash equilibrium. However, bidders might not always have incentives to fully experiment, since by experimenting they sacri…ce current payo¤s in the hope of obtaining higher future payo¤s (see Fudenberg and Levine (1993b) for a formal model). Also, even full experimentation by one bidder may not lead to correct beliefs if the others are not already using NE strategies, and one may even interpret the set of SCE as the possible steady states once experimentation has taken place.
An alternative re…nement consists of placing further a priori restrictions on the beliefs that players are allowed to have in equilibrium. For example, in certain settings requiring bidders to believe that the support of the maximum of opponents'bids does not depend on their type would eliminate SCE in strategies that are not continuous. 29 Moreover, requiring bidders to believe that, for each of their types s i , G s i is such that the perceived pro…t function i ( j G s i ) is di¤erentiable would eliminate the SCE provided in the example in this section as well as those characterized in Proposition 9. 30 However, even if one were able to justify that players have di¤erentiable beliefs, this latter re…nement may be too strong. The spirit of SCE is that players form their beliefs using past data that is presumably …nite. To make the analysis tractable, consistency implicitly assumes that an unlimited amount of data is available. However, with …nite data it may not be possible to reject the hypothesis that the (right hand side) slope of the pro…t function at the equilibrium bid is di¤erent than zero, even if this were actually the case. 31 More generally, further work is needed to understand both the dynamics of experimentation and the actual estimation strategies of real-life bidders. Advances in this respect would provide better guidance about the re…nements that would be appropriate in di¤erent circumstances. Nevertheless, as long as there is room left for beliefs to be incorrect in the presence of partial data, the …ndings in this section remain relevant.
Implications for the empirical auction literature
Once the issue of bidder identi…cation has been studied, a natural question is what are the implications for the testing and estimation of a structural auction model where the econometrician takes into account that bidding behavior depends on bidders'observation of past outcomes. The information about the value of the object. Esponda (forthcoming) de…nes the notion of a behavioral equilibrium and applies it to general contexts where players ignore such selection problems when learning. In symmetric …rst price auctions, the presence of such naive bidders generates underbidding in equilibrium. 2 9 In the context of the example in this section, (s) = for s 2 [:5; 1] is a symmetric SCE strategy that is not continuous at s = 0:5, but where bidders must believe that the support of the opponent's bids changes with their own type. 3 0 It is an open question whether a non-Nash SCE exists in the monotone-symmetric model under the di¤erentiability re…nement, since a bidder may still choose to bid at a local, rather than a global, maximum. 3 1 If bidders use, for example, Kernel estimation, then even unlimited data may result in an imprecise estimate of the right hand side derivative of the pro…t function at the equilibrium bid. The reason is that the Kernel estimate of this function is not necessarily consistent near this boundary point (e.g. Zhang, Karunamuni, and Jones, 1999). distinction between bidder and econometrician identi…cation highlighted in this paper is important because in circumstances where the econometrician has managed to collect enough data to Nashidentify the model, it is still possible that the data available to bidders at the time of bidding were not su¢ cient to justify that players play a Nash equilibrium. In a private values setting, for example, the econometrician may have observed all bids (therefore obtaining the probability of winning faced by each player), but inferring players'valuations (and therefore the primitives of the model) assuming that players themselves have correct beliefs about their probability of winning is likely to be inadequate if the auctioneer only reveals the winning bid. 32 Similarly, in a pure common value setting, it is important for identi…cation that the econometrician obtains ex-post estimates of the common value of the object (Hendricks, Pinkse, and Porter (2003)), but in addition he must make sure that bidders themselves learn by accessing this information. The latter may not always be true if, for example, bidders only obtain this information after several years and in a context where di¤erent market conditions render extrapolation from the past inadequate. On a more positive side, in cases where the econometrician has enough data and players have correct beliefs in a SCE, the standard identi…cation and estimation approach is robust to the use of the less restrictive and more realistic concept of self-con…rming equilibrium.
The characterizations of SCE provided in the paper can also be applied to test whether bidders do play a SCE, and to estimate the parameters of a structural model under the assumption that they do play a SCE. To illustrate how to establish testable restrictions, let P be the set of probability distributions with bounded support on R N + . A distribution P 2 P of observed bids B 1 ; :::; B N , with support supp P , is Nash-rationalized by a private values model if P is the NE distribution of bids when valuations are distributed according to some primitive F S . Similarly, P is SCE-rationalized by a private values model where the winning bid is observed if P is the SCE distribution of bids when valuations are distributed according to some primitive F S .
For a …xed P , let
) denote the probability that bidder i would win with bid b i in those cases where she chooses to bid b t i . If the data come from play of a NE, optimality requires that for every observed bid b t i with associated valuation s t i ,
for all b i . To compare this expression with the one resulting under the assumption that bidders play a SCE and observe only the winning bid, de…ne 33
The optimality condition in (1) can then be written in two steps:
The expression H i (b t i ; b i ) can be obtained from the data, and in an experimental setting where s t i is known it is then possible to test whether bidders do play a NE by checking that (2) and (3) are satis…ed. In a non-experimental setting valuations are usually not observed, but it is still possible to test for NE behavior by asking whether for each observed b t i there exists a corresponding s t i that satis…es (2) and (3). Now consider the same private values setting where the auctioneer only reveals the winning bid. By Lemma 4, equation (1) is now required to hold only for all b i b t i . Hence, in terms of data, equation (3) is required to hold, but not (2). In addition, since expected payo¤s must be positive, it follows that s t i
must also hold in a SCE. Hence, (3) and (4) can now be used to test for SCE behavior. 34 Proposition 11 (i) A distribution of bids P 2 P is Nash-rationalized by a private values model if and only if for almost every b t = (b t 1 ; :::; b t N ) 2 supp P , for all i 2 N ,
(ii) A distribution of bids P 2 P is SCE-rationalized by a private values model where only the winning bid is observed if and only if for almost every b t = (b t 1 ; :::; b t N ) 2 supp P , for all i 2 N ,
, it follows that, as expected, SCE behavior imposes weaker restrictions on observable bids.
If an observable distribution can be either Nash or SCE rationalized, it is then possible to use the set of s t i that satisfy the corresponding inequalities (2), (3), and (4) to estimate the primitive F S . This estimation method has been pioneered by Guerre, Perrigne, and Vuong (2000) under the assumption of Nash equilibrium. In general, for each b t i there will be multiple s t i 's consistent with SCE behavior, so that methods for bounding the primitive will need to be applied (see Haile and Tamer (2003) for an application of such methods in the context of English auctions).
Conclusion
Information feedback may a¤ect competitive outcomes through its in ‡uence on players'perceptions about their strategic environment. This role of feedback determined both the setting and the choice of self-con…rming equilibrium as a solution concept. The …ndings indicate that relaxing the assumption of Nash equilibrium in a realistic way can provide important insights on previously unexplored issues while still restricting behavior in equilibrium. In fact, unambiguous results were obtained precisely in those settings where auction theory obtains unambiguous comparative statics results. Finally, the approach followed in this paper may be fruitfully applied to obtain novel results in other settings about the e¤ect of information feedback on players'beliefs about their strategic environment. 
In addition, by the independence assumption it follows that G 0 
so that all bidders have correct beliefs about their probability of winning with any bid, and therefore is a NE.
ii) Suppose b 2 < b 1 . Then for all i 6 = 1,
; so all bidders except 1 have correct beliefs. If bidder 1 also had correct beliefs, then then proof would be completed. So suppose bidder 1 does not have correct beliefs about her probability of winning in the range b 1 < b 1 . Then construct a pro…le b 1 that di¤ers from 1 only for those bids that win with probability zero in equilibrium, i.e. b < b 1 . For this case, modify the strategies for bidders i 6 = 1 so that bidder 1's beliefs are actually correct. Note that these new bids still win with probability zero and so are optimal. Then b constitutes a Nash equilibrium pro…le, since all players are playing best responses, and their beliefs are correct. This implies that SCE N E for pro…les that are restricted to those bids that win with strictly positive probability.
Proof of Proposition 3. Let be a SCE. Since I i = (B i ; B 1 ; B 2 ; V i ), consistency implies that type s i who bids b i = i (s i ) has correct beliefs about the joint distribution of (b i ; B 1 ; B 2 ; V i ). Following the argument in the proof of Proposition 1, type s i must have correct beliefs about the joint distribution of (B max i ; V i ). From this joint distribution, type s i can then correctly compute both its probability of winning (as argued in Proposition 1), and its expected value conditional on winning with any bid
Hence, is also a NE.
Proof of Lemma 4.
Part (i). Only if. Let be a SCE. Let G s i be type s i 's belief in equilibrium. As argued in the proof of Proposition 2, since the winning bid is observed it follows that for every
. Therefore, i (s i ) gives higher expected payo¤ than choosing any other bid b i i (s i ): In addition, players know that they can get a payo¤ of at least zero by bidding zero, so that i ( i (s i ) j G 0
where the LHS of (A1) is nonnegative (which is possible since the RHS is nonnegative by assumption). Since i 2 R ( i ), it then follows that i (s i ) is optimal given beliefs G s i . It remains to check that such beliefs are consistent when only the winning bid is observed. As argued in the proof of Proposition 2, consistency requires beliefs about expected pro…t to be correct for bids above the equilibrium bid, and this requirement is satis…ed by G s i constructed above. Finally, since when b max i < b i nothing is observed about other players'bids, consistency places no restriction on beliefs about the probability of winning for bids below the equilibrium bid (except that P i must be a distribution and in particular cannot be negative, a restriction which can be shown to be satis…ed together with (A1) and the fact that that the LHS of (A1) is nonnegative). By optimality and consistency, is then a SCE.
Part (ii). The proof is analogous to part (i), except that it remains to show that, in the interdependent values model, when only the two highest bids and winners'own valuations are observed, Consider the behavior of types s 1 and s 2 who respectively make pro…ts 1 0 and 2 0 when everyone plays SCE ; and note that it must be true that 0 1 < 2 (since types s 1 and s 2 win under exactly the same conditions on opponents'types, but u(s i ; fs i g) is increasing in s i ). Since and by assumption that SCE is nondecreasing it follows that SCE must be increasing.
Regarding the initial condition, Milgrom and Weber (1982) show that the valuation of the lowest type s when every other opponent is also of type s is N E (s). Suppose that lim s!s SCE (s) > N E (s). Then there is a small enough " 0 such that type s+" 0 wins with strictly positive probability, pays more than her valuation, and therefore makes negative expected utility, which is not possible in a SCE. Suppose instead that lim s!s SCE (s) < N E (s). Then a small " increase in her bid would raise type s's expected payo¤ from zero to some small positive number. Since the winning bid is revealed and since beliefs are monotone, type s would then (correctly) believe that she could do better by deviating to such a higher bid.
Proof of Lemma 6. Preliminaries: Denote by
the expected utility of winning the object for a bidder of type s whose opponents'maximum type is t. Expected utility of type s from bidding b when all other bidders play a strategy that is continuous and increasing is given by
where is the inverse of and F m is the conditional distribution of the maximum of opponents' types given own type s, with density f m . When choosing a best response to , it is enough to consider bids in the range of , so that (x) is a best response to for type s if and only if x 2 arg max x2[s;s] ( (x) j G 0 s; ). Assuming di¤erentiability, let
denote the derivative of expected utility with respect to b, evaluated at (x). Then if N E is a Nash equilibrium, it follows that (A2) is zero when x = s and therefore
There are three cases to consider for the increasing function that satis…es lim s!s (s) = N E (s). Hence, (s ) cannot be the optimal bid of type s given when restricted to bids higher or equal than (s ). The claim follows since S is a set with strictly positive measure. Claim 6.4: If either case 2 or 3 holds, then s : (s) = 2 arg max b (s) (b j G 0 s; ) > 0: Proof : If case 2 holds, then the proof is analogous to Claim 6.3 and is therefore omitted. Suppose that case 3 holds. Then there exists s 0 > s 0 such that, for every s 2 (s 0 ; s 0 ); reducing the bid from (s) to lim s"s 0 (s) produces (i) a negligible loss in the probability of winning, (ii) a negligible loss in the expected value of the object conditional on winning (since u is continuous in s i ), and (iii) a non-negligible decrease in the amount being paid for the object. Hence, there is a bid lower than (s) that provides higher utility and the claim follows. Proof of Proposition 11. Part (i). By straighforward algebra from equation (1), b t i is optimal if and only if If the inequality condition holds, then the above interval is nonempty and we can de…ne a function f : R N + ! R N + such that f (b t 1 ; :::; b t N ) = (s t 1 ; :::; s t N ), where for all i, s t i belongs to the interval above. Let F S denote the joint distribution of f (B 1 ; :::; B N ), where B 1 ; :::; B N are distributed according to P . Then by construction P is the NE distribution of bids when the primitive is F S . Consider now what happens when the condition stated in (i) fails, so that the above interval is empty for a set of bids of strictly positive measure. Then no s t i exists for which it is optimal to bid b t i , and therefore P is not a Nash equilibrium distribution of bids. The proof of part (ii) is established along similar lines.
